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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

NN B. HOPKI S, )

Plaintiff, )

)
v. ) Civil Action

o. 84-3040

)
PRICE WATERHOUSE, )

)
Defendant. )

)
PLAINTIFF'S POST-TRIAL BRIEF
I.

INTRODUCTION
Ann Hopkins' claim here is that Price Waterhouse
discriminated on the basis of sex in refusing to make her a
partner. She helped bring in more business that any of the 87
men who were considered for partner ship when she was. She worked
long, diligently and productively. And she was an excellent
manager who earned the respect and admiration of the highest
level officials of her principal client, the Department of State.
Price Waterhouse cannot dispute these points and instead
relies entirely on the subjective criterion of "interpersonal
skills" as its putative nondiscrirainatory justification for
denying her a partnership and thereby causing the termination of
er employment. But this is a transparent mask for sex
discrimination. The most eloquent evidence on this point

V Unless otherwise noted, the record support for the factual
statements herein is found in plaintiff's Pro osed Findings of Fact filed May
3, 1985.

concerned the advice given plaintiff by Thomas Be er, the
partner-in-charge of her office and a strong supporter. After
Hopkins was first passed over for partnership in March 1983 and
placed on "hold" status, he counseled her on how to improve her
chances with dissenting partners: he said she should "walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely. There
could be no better proof that the concerns about plaintiff s
"interpersonal skills" were directly tied to her sex.
The decisionmakers on plaintiff's quest for partnership were
all men, and the criterion employed

interpersonal skills is

inherently elusive. To be sure, there may be nothing unlawful
per se about a group of men using subjective criteria to evaluate
and reject a woman. But experience has shown that those guilty
of discrimination frequently try to justify their actions by
hiding behind unsupported, subjective reasoning. For this
reason, courts consistently have ruled that such subjectivity is
"highly suspect and must be closely scrutinized because of [its]
capacity for masking unlawful bias." Davis, v. Califano, 613 F.2d
957, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Such scrutiny is especially
appropriate when a rejected female candidate fares
extraordinarily well under all objective criteria, only to be
rejected on the basis of a single, highly subjective criterion.
Careful scrutiny of defendant's asserted reason for denying
partnership to Ann Hopkins shows that considerations of sex are
present and played an important role in the decision. Of course,
where discrimination is present to any degree, there is a
"presumption that it played a part in the decision, and
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complainant is entitled to a strong presumption that such is the
case." Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 403
F.Supp. 1240, 1242 (D.D.C. 1975), reversed on other rounds, 551
F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083
(D.C. Cir. 1976). In Rogers v. EEOC, the Court of Appeals
re ersed because it found that the evidence clearly showed that
the victim of discrimination was less qualified for the position
in question then another competitor; hence it was determined that
he would not have gotten the job even in a bias free setting.
This is not the case here. Price Waterhouse sets no ceiling
or quota on the number of partners admitted each year, so Ann
Hopkins was not competing for a pre-determined number of slots,
let alone a single or unique position. Thus, in order to
prevail, she need not prove that she was more qualified than a
particular an (although she would do well on such
comparisons) . Rather, she need only show that discrimination
infected the fir 's refusal to make her a partner. And once
plaintiff has made this showing, defendant cannot escape
liability by comparing her qualifications with those of men.
Instead, to escape liability, defendant must prove that
discrimination was i material to the refusal to extend a
partnership offer to Hopkins. This is an exceedingly heavy
burden, since it is conceded that she was well suited for
partnership in every area except interpersonal skills. As we now
emonstrate, Ann Hopkins was not deficient in interpersonal
skills and, in any event, she was treated differently with
respect to that criter ion than similarly situated males. In sum,
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price Waterhouse has not met its burden.

II.

ANN HOPKINS WAS THE ONLY WOMAN PROPOSED FOR
PART ERSHIP DURING HER SELECTION CYCLE, AND HER
NON-SELECTION RESULTED IN HER SEPARATION FROM
PRICE WATERHOUSE

Plaintiff s office

the Office of Government Services

(OGS) in Washington, D.C.

proposed her for partnership in

August 1982 along with two men. Price Waterhouse makes its
partnership decisions nationally, and firm-wide Hopkins was the
only woman of 88 candidates under consideration during the 19821983 selection cycle. The firm's governing Policy Board decided
in March 1983 to admit 47 of the men, to reject 21, and to place
20 candidates

including plaintiff

on "hold" status. Of the

latter, 15 men and plaintiff were eligible for reconsideration in
August 1983, while four were on two-year holds.
In August 1983, all 15 male "holds" who were eligible for
reconsideration were again proposed by their offices, as were two
of the four men who had been placed on two-year holds.
Plaintiff's office decided, however, not to propose her again.
Thus, of the 20 candidates put on hold in March 1983, 17 were
again proposed for partnership the following August. The only
exceptions were plaintiff and two of the two-year holds. And of
the 17 candidates who were reconsidered, 15 were admitted to
p rtnership. Overall, then, a total of 62 of the 88 candidates
(70 per cent) originally proposed for partnership in August 1982
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were admitted either during that selection cycle or the next.
When Ann Hopkins was not re-proposed for partnership in
August 1983, her chances to become a partner ended. Her office
deleted her name from its partnership selection forecast, where
it had been since 1980, and one of the partners
Epelbaum

Donald

advised her to resign. She submitted her resignation

in December 1983, and her last day at Price Waterhouse was
January 17, 1984.

III.

PLAINTIFF WAS DISCRIMINATED AGAINST BOTH BECAUSE SHE
WAS TREATED DIFFERENTLY THAN SIMILIARLY SITUATED ALES
AND BECAUSE HER SEX INTRUDED INTO THE SELECTION PROCESS

This case is unique in certain respects. Apparently it is
the first case of discrimination in partner selection to go to
trial since the Supreme Court's decision in Hishon v. King &
Spaldin ,

U.S. , 103 S.Ct. 2229 (1984), that such claims

are properly brought under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. Price Waterhouse itself appears unique among
partnerships. Certainly it dwarfs even the largest law firms.
Defendant has nearly 700 partners and over 6000 professional
e ployees located in 90 offices throughout the country, and its
process of selecting new partners is unusually structured,
institutionalized and documented. The partners themselves
largely avoid talking to one another about candidates. Instead
they provide their views on a confidential basis to the firm's
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Admission Committee, an arm of its Policy Board. An the
candidates do not participate in the process at all. There is no
interview, no chance to respond to questions or criticisms.
More specifically. Price Waterhouse's Policy Board decides
annually each March which of 75 to 90 candidates propose by
local offices will be ad itted, rejected or held for
reconsideration the following year. he partnership selection
cycle begins in August, when local offices prepare written
roposals nominating candidates. The proposals are sent to all
the partners, who have the opportunity to prepare written
evaluations ("long form" or "short for ," depending on degree of
contact). The evaluations are sent to the Ad issions Committee,
whose members also visit the offices that have proposed
candidates and prepare reports of interviews conducted there.
The Committee then reviews the evaluations and reports and makes
"yes," "no" or "hold" recommendations to the Policy Board.

Memoranda are written justifying the Committee's negative and
hold reco mendations, but no memoranda are prepared on those
candidates recommended for admission. Notes of Policy Board
eetings reflect the final decisions reached on each candidate
and in some cases the discussion on particular individuals.
Price Waterhouse's partnership mechanism is especially
sensitive to negative comments by individual partners. In fact,
Joseph Connor, the firm's Senior Partner and Chairman of its
Policy Board, has said that "we look for the negatives" an "we
focus on the negative comments." As will be shown below, the
Board does not always act on the negative remarks (although it
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di in plaintiff's case), but they are often given close
consi eration.

The result is that intensely negative partners may be able
to override strong support for a candidate and block admission,
even if their actual contact with the individual has been
brief. This is what Price Waterhouse says happened with Ann
Hop ins when she was proposed for partnership in August 1982.
She ha solid support from her own office, but some of the
partners from other offices made intensely negative comments
about her personality. As Mr. Connor put it, "those who had less
than full time involvement with Ann, were in effect the deciders
on this one."

The firm's defense

that the initial refusal to admit

plaintiff was lawfully groun ed on intense objections from some
partners who did not know her well

is invalid for two

reasons. First, the Policy Board has a track record of admitting
men even though serious questions have been raised about their
interpersonal relations. This makes Ann Hopkins a victim of
classic disparate treatment. But even if there was no
differential treatment of this sort, plaintiff would still
prevail. This is true because it is clear that so e of the
negative votes were attributable to Hopkins' sex. Hence, even
under defendant's view of the facts, the fir 's institutional
echanism for partnership selection both magnified and
i plemented the discriminatory views of some of its partners.
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A. Plaintiff Was Conce edly ell-Qualified for
Partnership in ll Areas Except the Single One
of Interpersonal Skills that Defendant
Pretextually Relies on to Justify its Denial
of Partnership to Her

Ann Hopkins had superb partnership credentials. This is
im ortant because the firm has acknowledged that it "weighs" each
candidate's attributes, so that strengths in one area may offset
weaknesses in another. This type of "weighing" was routinely
done for men, and otherwise well-qualified male candidates were
admitted even though serious questions had been raised about
their interpersonal skills. Thus, even assuming that the
negative comments made about plaintiff were sexually neutral
and they were not

it is still important to determine whether

she had offsetting strengths, since this is what was done for
male candidates. There is no question that she did.
Plaintiff had professional attributes that placed her at or
near the top of all candidates under consideration for
partnership in 1982-1983. Her job was to sell and manage Federal
contracts for large computer based information systems, and she
per formed extremely well. The par tner ship proposal prepared by

her office (OGS) stated that:

Ann Hopkins performed virtually at the
partner level for the U.S. State
Department. While many partners were
"involved" with the client, State Department
officials viewed Ann as the pro ect manager,
supervising twenty staff and ten client
personnel. This was a difficult job
highly competitive, demanding delivery
schedules, and a volatile client.
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* * *

. . . with the deft touch of an outstanding
professional, Ann delive ed our detailed
approach to, and qualifications for, the
implementation of the FMS in embassies and
posts throughout the world. It was an
outstanding performance and the State
Department agreed as they awarded the $25
million project to our firm.
* * *

In her five years with the firm, she has
demonstrated conclusively that she has the
capacity and capability to contribute

significantly to the growth and profitability
of the firm. Her strong character,
independence and integrity are well
recognized by her clients and peers. Ms.
Hop ins has outstanding oral and written
communication skills. She has a good
business sense, an ability to grasp and
handle quickly the most complex issues, and
strong leadership qualities.
Price Waterhouse's Admissions Committee questioned
plaintiff's "interpersonal skills" and recommended that she be
placed on "hold," but it nevertheless observed that:

Hopkins has demonstrated many of the
characteristics of an outstanding
professional. In particular, she has proven
that she can market, manage and control
large, computer-based systems design and
development projects, which skill is
considered adaptable to both commercial and
public sector clients....

The praise bestowed on plaintiff is understandable. Like
most firms, Price Waterhouse values such qualities as the ability
to generate business (practice development or PD in the firm's
lexicon), the knack of satisfying clients, dedication, integrity,
and managerial and technical competence. Hopkins shone in all
these areas. At the time she was being considered for partner,
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ghe ha played a key role in securing three multimillion dollar
contracts

two with the Department of State and one with the

Fa ers Home Administration. When the third of these, the FmH
contract was awarded, Thomas Beyer wrote that " nn Hop ins has
done it again!" The total value of these contracts to the firm
approached $40 million. This was a greater amount of business
than that generated by any of the 87 men who were being
considered along with her.
Plaintiff also managed contracts. She did first rate work
here as well, and she totally impressed her principal client, the
Department of State. Two high level State officials, both at the
Assistant Secretary level, testified for Hopkins at trial: Robert
Lamb, Assistant Secretary for Administration and Security, and
Roger Feldman, the Department's Comptroller. Both called her
wor outstanding, and Assistant Secretary Lamb said that he
articularly valued her "intellectual clarity" and had tried to
hire her. These officials are hardly pushovers; Thomas Beyer
says that State is a "tough, very demanding client" (PI. Ex. 13).
In addition to generating more business, plaintiff also
billed more hours than any of the 87 men under consideration, so
her dedication is apparent. In addition, she had a reputation
for "strong character, independence and integrity," and her
technical competence and managerial skill were acknowledged by
both OGS and the Admissions Committee: "she has proven that she
can market, manage and control large, computer-based projects
..." (emphasis supplied).

If Price Waterhouse truly wished to "weigh" plaintiff's
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attributes, the positive side of the scale would easily
predominate, even if the criticisms of her personality traits
were deemed valid. Again, the only negative factor by the
defendant's own admission was "interpersonal skills," which by
any measure paled in significance and weight next to the superb
qualifications Ann Hopkins possessed in other areas.

B. The Interpersonal Skills Criticis Is Pretextual

In virtually every respect, Ann Hopkins was a superior
partnership candidate. But Price Waterhouse nevertheless clai s
that she was rejected because a number of partners criticized her
interpersonal skills. Under the analytical framework in
McDonnell Dou las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Texas
Depa t ent of Co munity Affai s v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981),
plaintiff easily established a prima facie case of sex
discri ination. She is a wo an; she was qualified and considered
for partnership she was not admitted; and 62 men

and no women

were admitted in the relevant time period (47 in the 1982-1983
selection cycle and another 15 the next year after they had first
been placed on hold). Defendant has articulated a
nondiscriminatory reason for the refusal to admit

an asserted

deficiency in plantiff's interpersonal skills. So the real
question is whether defendant's reason is pretextual.
We use three separate and independent approaches to show
pretext. First, a large part of defendant's argument is that
Hopkins treated staff in a harsh manner and could not get along
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with staff members. The record does not support this. Second,
men who were seen as having problems with interpersonal s ills
we e nevertheless admitted by the Policy Board if they were
otherwise well qualified. That is, the Board treated plaintiff
differently than similarly situated men, and she was therefore a
victim of disparate treatment. Third, the concerns that partners
exp essed about plaintiff's interpersonal s ills were linked to
her sex. She is direct and forceful, and it is evident that some
pa tners did not like these qualities in a oman, even though
they accepted them in their male colleagues. This is another
variety of disparate treatment, but it operates directly at the
level of the partners making the initial evaluations. So that
even if the Policy Board itself neutrally considered Hopkins'
candidacy, it was building on, and giving effect to, underlying
discrimination.

1. Plaintiff Did Not Alienate Her Subordinate Staff

If a person in plaintiff's position truly had problems with
interpersonal skills, they would be reflected in her dealings
with clients, staff and partners. Hopkins had no problems
whatever with clients

quite the contrary. Defendant has no

choice but to concede this. But Price Waterhouse argues that she
was abrasive and overbearing with her staff and that subordinates
di not want to work for her. In fact, the firm has suggested
that much of the opposition to plaintiff from partners was really
being voiced on behalf of the staff.
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This argument is an afterthought. Ann Hop ins' staff liked
and respected her, and the firm never saw her as having serious
p oblems in this area that could hurt her chances for
pa tnership. Early in plaintiff s tenure at Price Waterhouse, a
few concerns were raised about her dealings with staff. Thomas
Beyer testified about these matters, the last of which was in the
spring of 1981. (The only person identified by Beyer who
testified was Karen Nold, and she expressed strong admiration and
respect for plantiff.) Then in June 1981 Hopkins had a
counseling session with Fred Laughlin, who suggested that she
"soften her image." But even then, Laughlin called her a
"partner candidate" and said that she had shown "[s]ubstantial
improvements during year in relationships with partners and
staff." Mr. Beyer, the partner-in-charge of Hopkins' office,

testified that she responded well to counseling and that she had
solid support in OSS as of the su mer of 1982, when she was
proposed for partnership.
In March 1983 the Policy Board placed Hopkins on hold. In
uly of that year, the OGS partners met to consider re-proposing
her. Benton Warder and Donald Epelbaum expressed strong
op osition, ho ever, and her candidacy was blocked. At that
meeting, Epelbaum said that part of his opposition was due to
criticisms he had heard from four of plaintiff's former
subordinates on a State Department project.
Three points need to be made about Epelbaum's report.
First, the project in question was the "fly-off" between Price
W terhouse and another firm to see which would be awarded a
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contract worth $30 million. The competition lasted for nearly
two ears and ended in March 1982, when Price Waterhouse got the
award. It was tense, and there were a series of internal

dea lines. Ann Hop ins managed Price Waterhouse's entry in the
"fly-offf" and Thomas Beyer said that "not one staff ember ever
suggested . . . that Ann was not an outstanding leader and should
be replaced." Second, all four indi iduals identified by
Epelbaum are still with Price Waterhouse, and two are now
partners. Yet none testified. When a party has control over
witnesses and declines to call them, it can be inferred that
their testimony would be adverse to the party's interests. .1/
Third, the project in question was ancient history at the time
Epelbaum first raised it at the pQ§ partners' meeting in July
1983. By that time, plaintiff had not supervised any of the
staff in question for at least 16 months.
The ostensible purpose of a "hold" decision is to permit a
partner candidate to correct perceived deficiencies. But no one
in the summer of 1983 bothered to check to see how plaintiff had
been dealing with staff over the preceding year. If this had
been done, it would have been evident that Hopkins had achieved

1/ See, e.g., Standardized Jury Instructions for the District of
Columbia (revised ed., 1981), section 3-6:
If a witness who could have given material testi ony
on an issue in this case was peculiarly available to
one party, was not called by that party and his
absence has not been sufficiently accounted for or
explained, then you may, if you deem it appropriate,
infer that the testi ony of the witness would have
been unfavorable to the party which failed to call
him.
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noteworthy results from the Word Processing Unit, to which she
ha<3 been assigned in October 1982 expressly to test her ability
to work with subordinate staff. And as Mr. Beyer testified, she
achieved these results precisely because she paid attention to
he personal concerns and morale of the staff; it was one of the
few times he had seen someone at the partner or manager level get
involved with lower level staff.
More important, Hop ins1 principal job during the period
between the summer of 1982 and the summer of 1983 was service as
project manager for the Real Estate Management Systems (REMS)
contract at State, a position she kept until she left Price
aterhouse in January 1984. Plaintiff headed a project team at
REMS, and her two deputies were Harry Barschdorf and Sandra
Kinsey. Kinsey succeeded Hopkins as project manager when Hopkins
left the firm. Both Barschdorf and Kinsey testified in detail
about their respect and admiration for Ann Hopkins as a
manager. Both expressed willingness to work with Hopkins again,
and neither was aware of any complaints about her from lower
level staff. Finally, both testified that no one had asked them
about plaintiff s relations with staff.
Price Waterhouse is trying to portray plaintiff as a tyrant
in her dealings with staff, but it won't wash. The firm did not
pro uce one former subordinate from OGS to testify about her. In
fact, the only staff member called was Barry Boehm from St.
Louis, who had worked with Hopkins during her four-week detail
there during the summer of 1982, when she managed a proposal
writing effort that led to the award of a $3 million FmHA

contract to Price Waterhouse. Hopkins testified credibly and in
detail about the difficulties she faced on this assignment. In
addition, Thomas Beyer said that QQ§ had developed a
"st eamlined" approach for proposal development, that the "St.
Louis office was not used to this," and that Hopkins "went
through hell" in St. Louis. Given these circumstances, staff
plaudits would not be expected. But even Boehm focused more on
his differences with Hopkins management style than with any
criticisms of her personal approach. On the contrary, she
frequently had dinner with the staff, and this led to what he
called an "element of camaraderie." Moreover, in one instance in

which Boehm's father-in-law needed assistance with an SBA loan,
plaintiff responded promptly and helpfully.
Ann Hopkins may not have been perfect in her dealings with
staff, but she was quite good

and she kept getting better

during her tenure with Price Waterhouse. The record was clear if
only those finding fault with her because she is a woman had
troubled to examine it. In any event, as in Lanphear v. Prokop,
703 F.2d 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1983), where the employer attempted to
justify its adverse action by claiming that the plaintiff was a
manager who had alienated the workforce, but failed to produce
an evidence that the workforce, in fact, was alienated, Price
Waterhouse here is left merely with its own unproven and selfserving denigrations of Hopkins' treatment of staff. There is no
proof to support these charges. Indeed, the proof is to the
contrary. She was liked by her subordinates and she was an
effective manager.
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2. Ann Hopkins Is the Only Candidate for Whom Negative
Interpersonal S ills Were Deter inative and Overrode
High Marks in All Other reas

As defendant s counsel noted at the close of trial, it is
not unusual for Price Waterhouse's partners to comment on the
personalities of partnership candidates. This is part of the
"fodder" of the admissions process. But it was unprecedented for
the firm’s Policy Board to refuse admission to a well qualified
candidate where the only adverse comments considered by the Board
concerned interpersonal skills.
Ann Hopkins is unique in having been given high marks in
ever other respect and in having been rejected by the Board
solely because of questions about interpersonal skills. Men in
her osition were invariably admitted. For example, Tom Green,
who as considered for partnership in 1982, conveys the image of
a "Ma ine drill sergeant," and the Policy Board considered
criticisms that he was "crude, crass, etc." Joseph Connor

ackno ledged that Green's manner and style presented serious
problems. Yet a me ber of the Policy Board defended Green,
saying that "He is a man's man; he is very direct," and the Board
decided to admit him. The same directness perceived to be
Present in Ann Hopkins did not generate the same laudatory
comments. Instead, when found in a wo an they were translated
into negative characteristics.
In the 1982-1983 selection cycle
Hopkins was placed on "hold"

the one in which Ann

the Policy Board ad itted four
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candidates for whom the Admissions Committee had recommended
"hold" status.

mong the four was Ernest Puschaver. The

Ad issions Committee's recommendation praised Puschaver's
echnical skills and practice development efforts. But the
Committee said that:

Puschaver is aggressive and self confident.
It is apparent that he has, at times, carried
these traits to excess with the result that a
number of partners comment on him in such
terms as "lacking maturity," "wise-guy
attitude," "headstrong," "abrasive and

overbearing" and "cocky." The [office]
partners rate him relatively low in the
managerial skills and personal attributes
categories as a result of these traits.
The Committee concluded that "the concerns expressed by partners
about [Puschaver's] personality traits were sufficiently
significant to warrant a Hold decision." Despite the Committee's
com ents, which were much harsher than its comments on plaintiff,
the Policy Board rejected the "hold" recommendation and decided
to admit Puschaver.
The Policy Board also considered David Todd in 1983. Todd
ad received "negative comments" for "stubborness and

inflexibility," but the Board decided to admit him, noting that
"[h]e does excellent work in bringing in work." Similarly, in
1984 the Board discussed the "great no. 'no's" for Michael
Steinberg, and it was said that these stemmed from his making a
"weak first impression." A Board member defended Steinberg,
howe er, saying that "in areas in which he is working they want
results and are not concerned abt. 1st impressions." The Board

a mitted Steinberg. (See PI. Ex. 20 at 5128, 5148-5149.)
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There is frequently no record of the nature of the
deliberations on can idates for whom the dmissions Committee
makes a favorable recommendation, since the Committee does not
prepare any memorandum in such cases. For this reason, it is not
possible to identify all the men who have been admitted despite
concerns about their interpersonal skills. But when as ed
hether such men exist, Donald Ziegler, the Chairman of the
Committee, responded, "Oh, yes."

Certainly the Policy Board has declined to admit men whose
inte personal skills, among other things, had been criticized.
But in such instances, there were other factors at work as
well. Such men were generally lackluster, or they were
relatively young and were placed on hold to "mature" and were
admitted the next year, or serious questions had also been raised
about the more objective aspects of their performance, such as
practice development or technical competence. These men cannot

airly be compared with Ann Hopkins. 2/ The people most like her
__ i.e., those who were generally seen as strong candidates but

whose interpersonal skills had been questioned

were men like

Tom Green, Ernest Puschaver, David Todd and Michael Steinberg.
he Policy Board admitted these men to partnership

in

puscha er's case over the "hold" recommendation of its Admissions
Committee

and the Board also admitted others in the same

category who could not be identified but whom Mr. Ziegler

admitted existed. 3/
The Policy Board treated plaintiff differently than
similarly situated men. They were admitted; she was not. This

Price aterhouse tendered an exhibit, Df. Ex. 64, purporting to sho
that 33 men rejected or placed on hold during the five-year period 1980-1984
were treated in the sa e fashion as plaintiff. In fact, none ere, and
defendant has now conceded this in part by saying that only seven of these men
"particularly paralleled" plaintiff. (See Defendant's Proposed Finding No.
65.) The seven are Messrs. Beal, LeRoy, Borkowski, Gould, Bosenbury, Cohn and
Homer, Plaintiff's Proposed Finding No. 48 shows how LeRoy, Gould, Rosenbury
and Cohn differ from Hopkins, and a similar analysis controls the remaining
three (i.e., Beal, Borkowski and Homer). Beal was seen as being only
"adequate, but not outstanding technically," and Borkowski had experienced
"some difficulties in dealing with lo er level staff of clients," and a number
of partners were concerned that "he will not bring any 'extra' to the firm."
T e Policy Board did not suggest that plaintiff suffered from any such
business related liabilities, and she admittedly had several "extra's." Ho er
was criticized for not being a "team player." Plaintiff, by contrast, was
praised because she was (Df. Ex. 43). In any event, Homer was placed on hold,
re-proposed the following year, and then favorably considered by the
Admissions
Committee
289). and
oreover,
the
t o males
with large
numbers of
'no's" ho ere
rejected (Tr.
Bayless
Burrall
(see
Defendant's
Proposed
Finding o. 61) had serious, substantive problems. Indeed, Burrall is not
®ven included in Df. Ex. 64. (Plaintiff's Proposed Finding No. 48 deals with
ayless.) Plaintiff is the only candidate who was not admitted to Price
Wate house initially or after being put on hold who was criticized
solely for deficiencies in interpersonal skills. (See generally Df. Ex. 64.)

3/

Defendant's Proposed Finding No. 16 says that only 13 of 32 partners
tavored plaintiff's admission, and that she was at the bottom of the overall
•artile rankings. For Tan Green, partner support was 14 of 30 (Df. Ex. 73 at
1102) hardly a material difference and Puschaver ranked 39 of 42 in
overall quartile rankings (Df. Ex. 36 at 3859; Puschaver is No. A 228).
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is disparate treatment pure and simple. _4/

3. The Negative Comments Made About Plaintiff's
Personality Were Based On Her Sex

In defendant's view? the Policy Board refused to admit
plaintiff after she was proposed for partnership in August 1982
because of intense, negative comments made by partners about her
interpersonal skills. It appears, in fact, that Price
Waterhouse's admissions process places a premium on negative
remarks; in Ann Hopkins' case, this was true even though many of
those commenting negatively barely knew her. As Mr. Connor said,
"those who had less than full time involvement with Ann, were in
effect the deciders on this one."
We have already shown that it is unreasonable to accept
defendant's argument at face value, because the Policy Board has
a track record of admitting men even though serious questions
were raised about their interpersonal skills. But even if this
were not so and such a comparative showing could not be made, she
will still prevail. This is because many of the negative
comments made about Hopkins were attributable to her sex. Hence,
even under defendant's view of the process, the partnership
mechanism operated to give controlling authority to the
iscri inatory views of some of the fir 's partners.

In cases of disparate treatment, "[t]he key is usually comparative
e i ence." Schlei and Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law (1983), at
15• As shown above, the relevant comparisons in this case show that plaintiff
Was t eated less favorably than com arable men.
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There is no question that the partnership process emphasized
the negative in approaching Ann Hopkins' candidacy. Mr. Connor
said so, as did Roger Marcellin, the Policy Board and Admissions
Committee member responsible for the office visit al ..QjJS.
Marcellin went so far as to call Thomas Beyer's views "baloney"
when Beyer correctly explained that plaintiff could not even get
adequate typing help in St. Louis. And the Policy Board refused
to credit the ultimate conclusion favorable to plaintiff reached
by senior St. Louis partners Tim Coffey and Tom Blythe,
preferring instead to dwell on their earlier reservations.

5/

It is also true that most of those who made negative
comments about plaintiff barely new her, and that most of the
comments themselves focused on her personality. Thus some of the
partners who filled out "short forms" called her "overbearing" or
"abrasive" or "suggest[ed] a course at charm school before she is
considered for admission." The comments were intense, saying
(inaccurately) that views about plaintiff were "uniformly
negative" and (also inaccurately) that she was "universally
disliked." These and other negative comments came from partners
who had worked with plaintiff for two days (Green); or who had
met her once at a fir breakfast for 30-45 minutes some two to
three years earlier (Docter); or who had attended a four-hour
meeting with plaintiff and others three to four years earlier
(Bruges); or who had met her only once, two to three years

Defendant erroneously suggests that Blythe did not change his view.
Ccrapare Plaintiff's Proposed Finding 51(b) with Defendant's Proposed Finding
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ea lier, in another staff member's office ("charm school"
Hoffman); or who had seen her at work only when she was
previously employed by Touche Ross some five to six years earlier
(Bartz) ; or who had criticized her leadership abilities on the
basis of a one-week project three years earlier in which she had
n0 leadership responsibilities (Wheaton); or otherwise with whom
plaintiff had "very little contact" (Haller) or could not
remember meeting at all (Carroll, Johnson). Another partner made
a negative comment about plaintiff after pulling a pistol from
his desk drawer during a Quality Control Review and asking
whether it made her nervous (Devaney). Still another gave her
high marks for her performance on the same QCR, particularly her
communications skills, then turned around and criticized her
ability to communicate and gave her the lowest possible overall
rating on her "short form" (Kercher). The Policy Board did not
inquire about this patent inconsistency in Mr. Kercher's views
and was instead content to accept his negati e comments. _6/
None of these partners worked closely with Ann Hopkins, but
those who did supported her. This was because they saw, on a
aily basis, the superb quality of her performance. This was
truest, of course, for Thomas Beyer and others at OGS. But it
was also true of Tim Coffey of St. Louis, whom Joseph Connor
called a "super partner." Coffee initially voted "hold" on
Plaintiff, but he changed to "yes" after observing her

_/ Defendant's attempt to question plaintiff's integrity (Defendant's
Propos d Findings 40, 42) must be rejected. The Policy Board examined this
pcncern and dismissed it, and defendant is foreclosed from raising it now.
OP ear, supra, 703 F.2d at 1317.
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performance first-hand at the orals on the FmHA proposal: "her
ability to understand what was going in that process was very
impressive to me." As a result, he concluded that "she would be
a aluable partner of} .OSS at that point in time. " U
The strong support given plaintiff by those who worked most
closely with her emphasizes the obvious: her opponents were not
loo ing at her performance. And the evidence shows that they
e e focusing on her sex.

First, there are several references indicating that
plaintiff was being viewed as a woman and not simply as a partner
candidate. These came from supporters as well as opponents. For
exa ple, Mr. Hoffman's reference to "charm school" could not have

been made about a man. Mr. MacVeagh, a supporter, said that
" [a]s a person, she has matured from a tough-talking somewhat
masculine hard-nosed mgr to an authoritative, formidable, but
much more appealing lady ptr candidate" (emphasis added). Tim
Coffey observed that Hopkins "may have overcompensated for being
a woman." Another supporter, Robert Kelly, referred to her as
"macho" in his office visit with Marcellin, but added, " [i]f you
get around the personality thing, she's at the top of the list or
way above average."

Kelly's comments were perceptive in linking the "personality

7/ This analysis applies even to Donald E elbaum. Epelbaum orked
closely with plaintiff only during the March-June 1982 period. After that,
his contact with her was sporadic. And Epelbaum said that he fully supported
Plaintiff's candidacy during the summer of 1982. He changed his mind, he
said, during the autu n of 1982 and the spring of 1983. But this was when he
s no longer o king with Hopkins and was not forced to consider daily -]Ust ho good her performance was.
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thing" to a view of plaintiff as "macho."

Most opponents of

Hopkins would not have found her personality traits objectionable
per se; rather, as shown above, they were objectionable only
because of her sex. She was friendly, bought meals for those
with whom she worked, cared about their children, helped with
business loans for their in-laws. Tim Coffey said that "she's
tough but certainly li able ... I enjoyed working with her and
would like to again." But some partners clearly found her
forceful, direct style undesirable in a woman. Roger Marcellin's
exchange with Lewis Krulwich provides especially compelling
evidence of this. Marcellin raised the question of Hopkins' use
of profanity, which other partners had raised with him. Krulwich
responded that "[p]eople are just focusing on that because it's a
lady using foul language (emphasis added), and he added: "Many
male partners are worse than Ann (language and tough
personality)." In fact, as Marcellin acknowledged, plaintiff is
not a "dirty mouth," although en with "dirty mouths" have become
partners.

Mr. Marcellin also provides the key to the most direct
evidence of the link between the negative comments about
plaintiff's personality and her sex. Marcellin testified
concerning the dmissions Committee's "hold" recommendation for
Hopkins, which praised her abilities in the areas of business
Production and management but questioned her interpersonal
skills. When asked about the ambiguity of this criterion,
Marcellin responded that Thomas Beyer, who Marcellin knew would
bia

e counseling plaintiff, "knew exactly where the problems
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II

And Beyer, when counseling Hopkins on how best to

overcome the "hold" decision and to convert it into a "yes,"
ad ised her to

walk more femininely, talk more femininely,
dress more femininely. He suggested that I
wear make-up, have my hair styled, wear
jewelry. He suggested that I go wherever
omen go. His wife went somewhere.

Mr. Beyer acknowledged giving this advice. It had nothing to do
with plaintiff s professional bearing or appearance
always ell turned out

she was

but it had everything to do with her

sex. Beyer knew that the principal objection to Ann Hopkins was
her perceived lack of femininity.
Price Waterhouse's Policy Board did not simply acquiesce in
this sex-based criticism of plaintiff's interpersonal skills.
Rathe the Board adopted it, finding Ann Hopkins competent but
lacking in "social grace." It is instructive that neither the
Board nor its Admissions Committee ever said this about any men,
but similar co ments were made about other wo en (e.g., Diana
Wilson: "very low in grace and personal characteristics"; Alexis
Dow

"curt, brusque, and overly aggressive).

Comments focusing on women's asserted lack of grace should

Christine Millen affords another exam le of the Board's differential
treatment of anen. She was "seen as having significant skills, both in
software i plementation and in the law firm areas [but] is not viewed as
having
those as
skills
e pected
of aemployee
PW partner."
The
Committee
that
Millen
"is regarded
a very
valuable
to the
firm,
now and said
in the
future,
and someone the firm should make a strong effort to retain." This marks the
instance in the period 1981-1984 in which the A missions Committee
affirm tively stated that a rejected candidate for partnership was so valuable
that a special effort at retention should be made. In fact, Millen left Price
Waterhouse after being rejected.
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be contrasted with remarks made about men. Paul Goodstat, the
Vice Chairman at Price Waterhouse responsible for Management
Con ulting Services and a member of the firm s Policy Board and
d issions Committee, made the following comments about John
Fowler, who was admitted in 1984:

He is aggressive and in the past has been
less than smooth at times in his contacts
w/other PW people. In total he is something
of a Tom Green (not Larry Kikkert) type,
i.e., aggressive, "good old boy," technically
very good as an EDP consultant, demanding of
his people, demonstrated ability to sell and
carry out large design and implementation
engagements. Probably a broader person than
Green or Kikkert.
Donald Ziegler, who chairs the Admissions Committee, testified
that these were all positive comments. But although the same
litany could have been said of Ann Hopkins, it became negative
when applied to her. In short, a perceived lack of grace in men
was not seen as a liability, but for women it was. This was true
at the Policy Board level as well as at the level of individu l
partners making evaluations.
From a common sense perspective, it is clear that the
co ments made about plaintiff's personality were directly related
to her sex. Some partners criticized her in terms only
applicable to women ("charm school"). Others were concerned
about things that they accepted in men, such as use of
Profanity. The Policy Board itself criticized Hopkins' supposed
iack of "social grace"; similar criticisms were applied to other
wo en but not to men. And most significant, Thomas Beyer advised
Plaintiff that she could best convert her "hold" into a "yes" if
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she would "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, ress more
femininely." This is the closest anyone is likely to come to a
"s oking gun" in a case involving sophisticated professionals.
The evidence of sex discrimination in this case is
unambiguous and needs no independent corroboration. Still, it is
instructive that Susan Fiske, a social psychologist with
expertise in stereotyping, reached the same conclusion.
Dr. Fiske examined the data relating to Hopkins' candidacy,
including the "short form" comments. In brief, she testified
that much of the expressed opposition to plaintiff was the
product of sex role stereotyping that resulted in the
exaggeration of her negative qualities and the discounting of her
achievements. This produced a split of opinion, since Hopkins1
supporters tended to focus on her achievements, which were
considerable. Given Price Waterhouse's system, however, the
stereotypers were able to block her admission. Hence Dr. Fiske
concluded that sex role stereotyping was a "major determining
factor" in the firm's refusal to admit Hopkins to partnership.
As she explained it:

It is my opinion that there was stereotyping
occurring in this organization and that it
was negative stereotyping and that its effect
on Ann Hopkins' evaluation was to accentuate
the negative because of her sex and that in
this particular setting the decision was
based on a very few intensely negative votes
that were profoundly influenced by
stereotyping, sexual stereotyping in
particular and that in effect she was blocked
by a few people who were reacting to her on
the basis of stereotypes.
By analyzing plaintiff's evaluations during the partnership
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sel ction process. Dr. Fiske concluded that behavior seen as
"outs oken or "independent" by Hopkins' supporters became
"o e bearing" or "abrasive" when viewed by her opponents: "I see

a very striking contrast in the way the sa e behavior gets
framed." She pointed out that the view of a forceful woman as
abrasive is consistent with stereotypical thinking. In addition,
intensely negative comments, such as the obviously incorrect
statement that plaintiff was "universally disliked," are also
characteristic of stereotyping.
Dr. Fiske testified that no one factor would be sufficient
to cause her to determine that stereotyping as present in a
given situation. Here, however, all factors pointed in the same
direction. Importantly, Dr. Fiske also testified that the
environment at Price Waterhouse did nothing to inhibit
stereotyping; there are not even any guidelines discouraging sex
discrimination in the partnership process. Hence a partner li e
Mr. Jerbasi could feel free to comment on at least two separate
occasions that: "I have a difficult time believing these women
are partner candidates. I have never met a woman in Price

Waterhouse who was capable of functioning beyond the middle
manager level and our present lady partners are not the least bit
i ressive." Given the evidence of stereotyping in this case,
all of which pointed in the same direction, Dr. Fiske concluded
hat sex role stereotyping was a "major determining factor" in
price Waterhouse's failure to admit Ann Hopkins to partnership.
gain, Dr. Fiske's testimony is confirmatory of what the
other evidence in the case unambiguously shows
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namely, that

plaintiff's sex played an important role in the ecision to
j-eject her bid for partnership. In Dr. Fiske's terms, her
conclusion that sex role stereotyping was a major determining
factor in Price Waterhouse s failure to make Ann Hopkins a
partner is "con ergent" with the other e idence in this case.

IV.

THE DECISION NOT TO RE-PROPOSE PL I TIFF WAS PART
AND PARCEL OF THE INITIAL DENIAL OF PARTNERSHIP
AND WAS ALSO BASED ON HER SEX

Men who are placed on hold are routinely re-proposed by
their offices and reconsidered the following year, and most are
ultimately admitted to partnership. In March 1983, 15 men were
put on hold, as was plaintiff. Four more men were placed on twoyear holds. All 15 men on regular holds were re-proposed in
August 1983. This was also true even for two of the four men
su posedly put on two-year holds, and 15 of the 17 men who were
reconsidered became partners with the firm. But Ann Hopkins was
not e-proposed. Instead, her name was removed from the

partnership forecast, and her chances to become a partner ended.
Defendant would like to portray the refusal to re-propose
plaintiff for partner as entirely separate and distinct from the
firm’s earlier decision to place her on hold. In fact, however,
t e two events are closely related and are part of a continuing
Process. The purpose of placing a candidate on hold status is to
Provide an opportunity to correct perceived deficiencies. This
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chance was give to men put on hold

but not to Ann Hopkins.

During the Policy Board meeting at which plaintiff was
placed on hol , Paul Goodstat, the Vice Chairman responsible for
MCS, said that he would "counsel her [and] get her involved in a
number of projects." He never did either. Joseph Connor did
speak to plaintiff. Among other things, he told her about a man
who had been placed on hold and who had later become a partner
aft r performing well on a special project to which Connor had
assi ned hi . He said he would try to find such a project for
her, but none was ever forthcoming.

Mr. Connor also told plaintiff that it would help her
chances if she went on another Quality Control Review and
perfo med well. Hopkins went on a QCR during the week of July
25, 1983, and she received a positive evaluation. Unfortunately
for her, the OGS partners had met the previous week and had
decided not to propose her again for partnership, although a man,
Thomas Colberg, was proposed. Colberg subsequently became a
partner.

Most critical of all, no one checked to see how Hopkins was
ealing with staff in 1983. According to Price aterhouse,
plaintiff was placed on hold largely because of concerns about
how she treated her staff. Joseph Connor said, for example, that
he took Tim ("super partner") Coffey's comments very seriously,
even though Coffey wound up supporting Hopkins. And Coffey's
concern had to do with plaintiff's dealings with staff. He
had no problems with her personally. On the contrary, he said
hat "i enjoyed working with her and I would like to again." Mr.
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Connor himself spoke about his own difficulties working under a
ty annical partner and said that he did not want others to have
o go through this experience.
But if staff relations really were a concern, then someone
fro P ice Waterhouse should have checked to see how plaintiff
was dealing with staff as of the summer of 1983, when she was up
f0r reconsideration. No one did. This is evidence of
iscrimination from two perspectives. First, it shows that hold
status was an empty vessel for her; unlike the men, she was not
given the chance to demonstrate improvement. Second, the failure
even to ask about Hopkins' current staff relations is persuasive
evidence of the pretextual nature of the criticisms leveled at
her in the first instance, before she was placed on hold. If
this was a real concern, the firm would have checked to determine
if she had made any improvement in the area.
Moreover, if anyone had checked, he would have found that
plaintiff was working effectively with staff at all levels. In
October 1982, she had assumed responsibility for managing the
Word Processing Unit and had achieved positive results in
productivity precisely because she paid attention to the morale
of the staff and involved staff in some aspects of decision
making. And on her principal project since the summer of 1982,
the REMS contract at State, she and her two deputies
Barschdorf and Sandra Kinsey

Harry

constituted a management team

that functioned smoothly and well. Both Barschdorf and Kinsey
testified about their admiration for plaintiff, their respect for
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hetf and their willingness to work with her again. _9/
There could have been no legitimate concern about Ann
Hopkins' dealings with staff as of the summer of 1983. But no
one checked on this. Instead th Q5S partners met, and two
partners

Benton Warder and Donald Epelbaum

succeeded in

bloc ing her re-proposal. There is no question that there were
just two strong opponents: Robert Kelly, a supporter of Hopkins,
obse ved during the partnership meeting that "if two partners
feel so strongly, can't overcome this." Epelbaum has
acknowledged that he was one of the two, and arder has admitted
that he was the other.
Warder's opposition to Hopkins can be analyzed using the
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework. She was a woman qualified
for re-proposal for partnership, and he opposed her, citing
"serious deficiencies" in her work. This referred to a review of
the REMS project which he conducted in the spring of 1983, and
his eference to "deficiencies" can only be pretextual. There
were no serious problems with REMS, and defendant today does not
attempt to argue that plaintiff's performance was in any way
responsible for the refusal to admit her. Warder himself wrote a
e o andum in September 1983

after the damage had been done

indicating his satisfaction with the way in which REMS was
proceeding. The utter destruction of Warder's expressed reason

Kinsey also testified that another a parently qualified oman in OGS
ie£t ithout becoming a partner (Tr. 436).
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for opposing plaintiff compels an inference of discrimination. 10/
This inference is strengthene by Warder's own comments. He
criticized plaintiff for talking like a "truck driver," even
tho gh she was not a "dirty mouth" and some men were. nd he
tol Karen Nold that he questioned whether women with more than
one child should be working. Ann Hopkins is the mother of
three.

Before the summer of 1983, Warder had consistently taken
public stands in favor of Hopkins' candidacy. He wrote a
positive evaluation of her in June 1982 and he supported her at
the July 1982 partners' meeting, which resulted in her
proposal. He also worked on the office's proposal memoran um.

In private, however, he was more equivocal: in his confidential
long form evaluation of September 1982, he voted "hold." Clearly
arder was acting hypocritically and was emboldened by the firm's
decision to place plaintiff on hold in March 1983. 11/ Hence he
developed an ostensibly neutral strategy of opposition; he
claimed to have found "serious deficiencies" in the work on

Warder also said that plaintiff told him that she was "awful" to him
at times on a State Department project. his was the project from which
Warder as later removed as managing partner at the insistence of the
Depart ent.

Warder also told his partners that plaintiff "lacks leadership" but
a parently did not explain this comment. In September 1982, however, when he
had com leted an evaluation form on Hopkins, he had given her a "2" on
leadership (long form attribute No. 17), the second highest score possible
(Df. Ex. 27 at 2012). There is absolutely nothing in the record to suggest
that plaintiff's leadership abilities had suddenly deteriorated.
Price Waterhouse has admitted that partners such as Warder ere
einbol ened by the firm's March 1983 hol decision. In its Trial Brief filed
before trial, defen ant states that "With knowledge of the result of the prior
ear partnership canvas, the OGS partners were now [i.e., in July 1983] ore
Wl ing to express their reservations." Defendant's Trial Brief at 27.
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rEMS. This strategy is transparent, as defendant recognized in
eciding not to call Warder to testify. The firm has tried to
"bury" him, but the record will not permit it. He was one of the
two partners who blocked Ann Hop ins' re-proposal, and his
opposition was based on her sex. The "truck driver" re ark
likely would not have been applied to a male candidate, and
surely the parent co ment would not have been made about a man.
The Burdine analysis can also be applied to Mr. Epelbaum's
opposition. He articulated two types of reasons for opposing
plaintiff: the criticisms of her former subordinates and his own
e perience dealing with her, particularly in the spring of
1983. e have already demonstrated the emptiness of the
ostensible staff criticism; like Mr. Warder, the individuals in
question could have been called by defendant but were not. In
addition, Epelbaum's recital of his own problems with plaintiff
suggests, at best, an exaggeration of the facts, and the record
sho s he is capable of such stretching. At the July 1983 OGS
partners' meeting, Epelbaum told his partners that he had
supported plaintiff the previous year. At trial, however, he
testified that he had told Roger Marcellin in November 1982 that
he ha moved from yes to hold. Clearly he was disingenuous
either with his partners or the Court. Moreover, the two
incidents that Epelbaum said moved him from a hold to an opponent
a lunch meeting with plaintiff after she returned from seeing
Mr• Connor, and a meeting with Mr. Beyer and plaintiff to discuss
a Possible staff transfer

do not withstand scrutiny.

As to the first, Epelbaum says that Hopkins tried to
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ntimidate him into supporting her by citing Mr. Connor's
supoort. But she had no reason to try to intimidate him, e en if
hat was her style (it is not). She thought he was a
supporter. After all, after she was put on hold, he had told her
that there were men who had been admitted who were "not fit to
lick [her] boots." 12/ s to the second incident, Epelbaum says

that plaintiff had reacted with hostility to his suggestions;
hence he was "upset because of the igor and the [table] pounding
an the tone of her response." Plaintiff denied acting in this
fashion. In addition, Mr. Beyer also testified about this
meeting, and he did not report any sort of hostile exchange.
As with Mr. Warder, Mr. Epelbaum's reasons for opposing
plaintiff evaporate upon analysis. 13/ Again, the most plausible
inference remaining is discrimination. And this is reinforced by
Epelbaum's own testimony. He admits that he felt that a man who
was admitted to partnership in 1983 was not "appropriate." Yet
he did not trouble to fill out an e aluation on the man. Under
Price Waterhouse's system, such silence could only be helpful to
the candidate. For Mr. Epelbaum to take action against a woman,
but to fail to act against a man whom he also viewed as
"inappropriate," is the essence of disparate treatment.

f As late as August 1983, plaintiff still thought Epelbaum su orted
her. hen it was becoming clear that she ould not be e-proposed, she called
hi for advice. (He told her to quit.) One is unlikely to request co nsel
f csn a known enemy on such an occasion.

Epelbaum also mentioned other reasons, such as plaintiff on one
occasion referring to his advice as "stupid." If any such incident occurred
and she denies the use of the term it happened at the latest in the fall
1982 and was not, according to Epelbaum, one of the t o factors that moved
him to firm o position.
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The evidence quite clearly reveals that plaintiff s "hold"
s atus was a charade. She was not given any meaningful
opportunity to demonstrate improvement, even if this was
needed. Since men were given such a chance and in fact we e
routinely reconsidered for partnership after being put on hold,
the firm's treatment of Ann Hopkins after she was placed on hold
can only be described as discriminatory. In addition, the two
men ho actually bloc ed her re-proposal both took into account
consi erations of sex. Certainly this was true of Warder, hose
own ords betray his sexism. And on this basis alone it must be
concluded that sex discrimination intruded into Price
aterhouse's post-hold treatment of plaintiff. Hence there is a
"presu ption that [discrimination] played a part in the decision,
and complainant is entitled to a strong presumption that such is
the case." Ro ers v. EEOC, supra, 403 F.Supp. at 1242. On this
reco d, defendant cannot show that plaintiff would have been
treate the same way even absent discrimination, and she should
therefore prevail.

V.

STATISTICAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS
PLAI TIFF'S CLAIM OF DISCRIMINATION
Statistical evidence may be used in cases alleging
iscrimination against a single individual, as well as in class
actions. Davis v. Califano, supra; Minority Employees at NASA v.
723 F.2d 958 (D.C.Cir. 1983). Statistics may be used to
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help in establishing a prima facie case or "to show that the
employer's stated reasons for the challenged actions are a
pretext for discrimination." Beggs, supra, 723 F.2d at 962.
Of Price Waterhouse's 662 partners, only seven are wo en.
This closely approaches the "inexorable zero" which both the
Supre e Court and the D.C. Circuit have said may raise an
infe ence of discrimination. Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 342 n. 23 (1977); Valentino v. United States Postal
Service, 674 F.2d 56, 73 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In addition
plaintiff's expert, Dr. Charles Mann, testified that, assuming
the availability of women for hire and eventual consideration as
partner was as low as two per cent, it is statistically unlikely
that the result of 7 of 662 occurred by chance. Defendant
presented no credible evidence to show that the actual
availability of women as lower than two per cent.
Dr. Mann also testified that women were proposed for
partnership at lower rates than men during the period when

plaintiff was being considered (selection years 1983 1985) and
that omen moved from new hire to manager a critical step on
the road to partner

more slowly than men. The evidence also

sho s that over 90 per cent of the people hired directly as
managers have been en and that this figure has remained constant
over several years, even though defendant claims to have
increased its efforts to employ women in positions leading to
Partnership. Defendant challenged aspects of Dr. Mann s
statistical presentation, but did not undermine the basic trends
that he found.
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Only ten or ele en women ha e ever been considered for
par nership at Price Waterhouse, as compared to over a thousand
The acceptance rate for omen is somewhat lower than for
men, but the total female figure is so small that it is difficult
to raw statistically reliable results. Nevertheless, this data
is consistent with the other statistical trends in showing a
patte n of more favorable treament for men than women at the
higher echelons of Price Waterhouse.
Overall, the statistics reinforce and are "convergent" with
all the other evidence in this case. Defendant s refusal to make
Ann Hopkins a partner constituted discrimination based on sex.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The evidence in this case can be viewed in two parts
first, defendant's refusal to admit plaintiff to partnership when
she first was considered; second, the refusal of defendant even
to reconsider plaintiff for partnership after she was placed on
hold. We have shown that sex discrimination infected both
aspects of the firm's treatment of plaintiff. She is therefore
entitled to a presumption that discrimination was a determining
factor in her failure to become a partner. Ro ers v. EEOC,
-gupra. And particularly since defendant sets no quota on the
number of partners admitted, Price Waterhouse cannot show that
Plaintiff would have been denied partnership even absent
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discrimination. Day v. Mathews, supra.

The e is no question that Ann Hopkins is a forceful,
dynamic, hard charging indivi ual. As we have shown, some of the
partners at Price Waterhouse

and even the Policy Board itself

could not accept these qualities in a woman. This is not the
first time that a court has grappled with the problem of
discrimination against what may be seen as a "pushy" woman. See
S elton v. Balzano, 424 F.Supp. 1231 (D.D.C. 1976). But it is
the first time that such a wo an has been so undeniably well
qualified. In this case, the careful scrutin required of the
subjective reasons for rejecting plaintiff shows them to be
pretexts for discrimination. Davis v. Califano, supra; see also
"Kee ing o en in Their Place: Stereotyping per se as a Form of
E ployment Discrimination," 21 Boston College L. Rev. 345, 395

(1980) .
We recognize that aspects of any partnership decision are
subjective and that there is nothing inherently unlawful about
this. But such subjectivity must be closely scrutinized where
the statistical imbalance is stark and where the candidate
rejected scores high marks on all reasonably objective
standards. Davis v. Califano, supra.

In this case, we are urging only that settled Title VII
Principles be applied to a partnership, as the Supreme Court said
they should be in Hishon v. King & Spalding. We are not
intruding on the normal discretion enjoyed by all partnerships to
ma e decisions on new members. We are seeking to insure only
that such discretion be exercised free from unlawful
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r

iscrimination, overt or subtle:
The history of our nation reflects the
e aluation of our understanding of the nature
of man (in the generic sense of the word) and
the legitimate aspirations and rights of the
individual. Attitudes which seemed benign at
one time are now understood to be
discriminatory [citations omitted]. The
beliefs that women should not have the right
to vote, practice law, or serve on the United
States Supreme Court, were once reflective of
majority view, and the law. We now
understand, somewhat belatedly, that these
concepts reflect a discriminatory attitude.
Today any person is free to hold to such
concepts, but such concepts may not serve as
the basis for job-related decisions in
employment covered by Title VII. Other
concepts reflect a discriminatory attitude
more subtly; the subtlety does not, however,
make the impact less significant or less
unlawful. It serves only to make the courts'
task of scrutinizing attitudes and
motivations, in order to determine the true
reason for employment decisions, more
exacting.

Lynn v. Re ents of the University of California, 656 F.2d 1337,
1343 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 823 (1982).
he effective reason for Price Waterhouse's failure to admit
nn Hopkins to partnership was her sex. A male candidate with her
strengths, achievements and personality would have been
admitted. As a result of this discrimination, plaintiff has
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ed loss of earnings and diminished career possibilities
entitled to full relief.

Respectfully submitted,

Do _

James

. tie er

KATOR, SCOTT & HELLER
1029 Ver ont Avenue, NW

Suite 900
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 393-3800
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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